Housing and Land Use—Avoiding Misuse of the Special Exception by unknown
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 1973
January 1973
Housing and Land Use—Avoiding Misuse of the
Special Exception
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship.
For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Housing and Land Use—Avoiding Misuse of the Special Exception, 1973 Urb. L. Ann. 327 (1973)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol1973/iss1/19
AVOIDING MISUSE OF THE
SPECIAL EXCEPTION
In Vogelaar v. Polk County Zoning Board of Adjustment," defend-
ant Board issued a special use permit to the Des Moines Metropolitan
Area Solid Waste Agency for the construction of a sanitary landfill.
Plaintiffs, neighboring property owners, objected to the construction
of the landfill and petitioned the Polk County District Court for a
writ of certiorari, protesting the issuance of the permit and alleging
that the Board had acted illegally in granting the permit. The dis-
trict court sustained the Board's action and plaintiffs appealed to the
Iowa Supreme Court. On appeal, granting of the permit was upheld
and plaintiffs' arguments that the trial court's decree was contrary to
the variance provision of the Iowa zoning enabling act 2 and was not
in the public interest, were rejected.3
The Iowa zoning enabling act in Vogelaar provides the mechanism
for county zoning decision-making. The act established a zoning
commission to hold hearings and make reports to the county council.4
The council was given the authority to adopt ordinances describing
the various uses of land in the county. The local zoning board of
adjustment was established to pass on individual cases to avoid any
arbitrary effect of the zoning law and also to provide for a degree of
flexibility within the zoning plan. The enabling act gave the board of
adjustment the power to hear special exceptions and grant variances. 5
The Vogelaar court sought to distinguish a special exception, for
which the waste agency applied, from a variance. Both are adminis-
tered by the zoning board of adjustment, but neither is adequately
distinguished in the enabling act. Many local authorities, parties and
even courts have had difficulty distinguishing the terms and their
functions. 6
1. - Iowa - , 188 N.W.2d 860 (1971).
2. IowA CODE ANN. § 358A.18 (1949).
3. - Iowa at , 188 N.W.2d at 863.
4. IowA CoDE ANN. § 358A.8 (1949).
5. Id. § 358A.10.
6. E.g., Parsons v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 290, 99 A.2d 149
(1953); Sipperly v. Board of Appeal on Zoning, 140 Conn. 164, 98 A.2d 907
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The special exception is not defined in the Iowa statute. The act
merely provides: "the board of adjustment may hear and decide
special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance upon which such
board is required to pass under such ordinance."7
The zoning enabling acts of most states contain a similar special
exception or special use provision," and the courts have been called
upon to define their function. Most courts agree that a special excep-
tion permits a use, not otherwise allowed in a particular district, when
certain conditions specifically set out in the ordinance exist.0 Thus,
the local board of adjustment is restricted to special exceptions spe-
cifically provided for by the county zoning ordinance. But, the
board's power to grant a special exception is not controlled by stand-
ards set up in the state enabling act; rather, state legislatures have
left it to the discretion of the local legislative body to determine
which uses may be permitted in a district.
The Polk County Zoning Ordinance- 0 provides for 18 such special
exceptions or special uses, including golf courses, mobile homes and
office buildings, each permitted only within specified districts. A
sanitary landfill is a special use also provided for in the ordinance,
and the board of adjustment may grant such special use in an A-1
agricultural district.?' The ordinance further provides a number of
conditions which the board may consider in reviewing an application
for a special use permit, including "the most appropriate use of the
land .... adequate open space for light and air, ... and the general
welfare of the persons residing or working in the neighborhood of
such use. 1 2
The variance is normally dealt with more fully in zoning enabling
acts.:1 3 The Iowa statute provides that the board of adjustment may
(1953); O'Conner v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 65, 98 A.2d 515
(1953); Doolings Windy Hill Inc. v. Springfield Twp., 371 Pa. 290, 89 A.2d 505
(1952); Leikins v. Ridley Twp. Zoning Bd., 367 Pa. 608, 80 A.2d 765 (1951).
7. IOWA COD, ANN. 358A.15(2) (1949).
8. E.g., Mo. Rav. STAT. § 64.120 (1966); TEx. Rv. Civ. STAT. art. 1011g
(1963); Wis. STAT. § 59.99(11) (1951).
9. E.g., Mitchell Land Co. v. Planning & Zoning Bd., 140 Conn. 527,
102 A.2d 316, 318 (1953); Rosenfeld v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 19 Ill. App. 2d
447, 450, 154 N.E.2d 323, 325 (1958); Harrison v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 74
R.I. 135, 139, 59 A.2d 361, 364 (1948).
10. POLX COUNTY, IOWA, ZONING ORDINANCE art. 19 (1970).
11. Id.
12. Id. amend. 10.
13. E.g., Tax. Rv. Civ. STAT. art. 1011g (1963); Wis. STAT. § 59.99 (1957).
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"authorize upon appeal, in specific cases, such variances from the
terms of the ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest,
where owing to special conditions a literal enforcement of the pro-
visions of the ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship."4 Under
this type of statute, strict adherence to the terms of the zoning ordi-
nance may be eased where literal enforcement would cause "unneces-
sary hardship." Since the board gets the power to grant variances
directly from the enabling act, no action by the local legislative body
is needed. The property owner is given the authority to use his
property in a manner forbidden by the zoning ordinance. This is
contrasted with the special exception, where the property owner puts
his property to a use which the ordinance expressly permits.
In Vogelaar, the court recognized that the Board of Adjustment was
acting in the capacity of deciding a special exception, and that the
plaintiff mistakenly argued that the trial court had exceeded its au-
thority under the variance provision of the Iowa statute. The use of
a sanitary landfill in an A-1 argicultural district was expressly pro-
vided for by a special use or special exception in the Polk County
Zoning Ordinance.- v The Des Moines Metropolitan Area Solid
Waste Agency merely had to show that the proposed use was expressly
permitted by the ordinance. The Board of Adjustment then made
its determination that the proposed use was so permitted, looked to
see that the conditions specified in the ordinance were met, and then
granted the special use permit.
The trial court found that issuance of the special use permit was
proper and necessary to the public good.1- In answer to plaintiffs'
argument that the trial court's holding was contrary to the public
interest, the Vogelaar court found it necessary to define the scope of
its review.
The zoning enabling act defines the method of review for a deci-
sion of a board of adjustment. The statute provides that a person
aggrieved by a decision of a board of adjustment may petition a
court for a writ of certiorari and specify the grounds of alleged ille-
gality of the board's decision.17 The statute further provides: "If
upon the hearing which shall be tried de novo it shall appear to the
14. IOwA CODE ANN. § 358A.18(3) (1949).
15. POLK COUNTY, IOWA, ZONING ORDINANCE art. 19 (1970).
16. - Iowa at - , 188 N.W.2d at 863.
17. IOWA CODE ANN. § 358A.18 (1949).
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court that testimony is necessary for the proper disposition of the
matter, it may take evidence." '
The de novo provision would appear to give the court full power
to determine the issues and rights of the parties involved and to try
the case as if the suit had been originally filed in that court. How-
ever, the Iowa Supreme Court interpreted the statute to mean that
the trial court's review is de novo only in that additional testimony
will be admitted if necessary for the proper disposition of the matter.
The court stated that testimony should be limited to any questions of
illegality raised by the certiorari petition."
In defining the scope of the de novo provision, the court closely
followed, but did not cite, previous Iowa cases. The early case of
Anderson v. Jester2o first interpreted the analogous city zoning en-
abling act21 and defined its version of what the court's role should be
in reviewing a board of adjustment's decision. The court found that
it was within the province of the legislature to determine the pro-
cedure and practice of judicial review, to make use of the writ of
certiorari and to provide for trial de novo if it sees fit.2 2 The court
stated that if the intention of the legislature had been to give the
aggrieved party the right to remove the whole matter from the board
to the court, the right of appeal would have been granted.2 3 Instead,
the legislature provided the writ of certiorari to allow questions of
illegality of the decision to be brought. Trial de novo is permitted
merely to allow additional testimony to be taken if necessary; and, the
admission of such testimony is limited to questions of illegality raised
by the petition of certiorari.
Other state legislatures have defined the scope of a court's review
of a board of adjustment's decision in different ways. One group of
states, including Massachusetts and Connecticut, has given the courts
broad power to review the board's findings. These states grant a full
right of appeal from the board's decision and give the trial court
complete de novo review authority on appeal.24 Other states provide
18. Id. § 358A.21.
19. - Iowa at - , 188 N.W.2d at 862.
20. 206 Iowa 452, 221 N.W. 354 (1928).
21. IowA Co ANN. § 414.12 (1949).
22. 206 Iowa at 456, 221 N.W. at 358.
23. Id. at 457, 221 N.W. at 359.




that the applicant must apply for a writ of certiorari, but no mention
of trial de novo is made.2 5 Indiana allows for a writ of certiorari and
provides that additional testimony may be taken, but then specifies
that "no such review shall be by trial de novo."28
Statutes similar to those of Massachusetts and Connecticut which
deal with different types of zoning decisions, but still grant complete
de novo review authority to courts on appeal in zoning cases, have
recently been questioned under state constitutions. A Kentucky ap-
pellate court in American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville and
Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission2r held a statute
unconstitutional which granted de novo review authority to courts on
appeal from a zoning commission decision. The court noted that
while the matter in controversy, a proposed adjustment to a master
zoning plan, was not the same as a special exception to a zoning regu-
lation, the appellate procedure was identical.2 8 Thus, the court said,
the decision in the case controls appeals from the board of adjust-
ment.29 The court held that under the statute it would be substi-
tuting its own judgment for that of the administrative agency by
hearing the case de novo, 0 The court characterized the zoning
agency's power in reviewing zoning decisions as "non-judicial" and
stated that under the de novo provision it would be performing an
administrative function in reviewing the commission's decision, thus
violating the separation of powers doctrine of the Kentucky constitu-
tion.31 This type of discretionary administrative decision is better left
to the expertise of the administrative agency, the court stated.32
An Alabama case, Ball v. Jones,3 3 held a statute unconstitutional
which prescribed a de novo trial in the circuit court upon appeal
from a zoning decision of the local legislative body of a city. The act
was held unconstitutional because zoning is a legislative matter, and
the legislature could not delegate this function to the courts. 34 The
25. See, e.g., Mo. lv. STAT. § 64.120 (1966); Wis. STAT. § 59.99 (1951).
26. IND. STAT. ANN. § 53-788 (1964).
27. 379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. App. 1964).
28. Id. at 454.
29. Id. at 458.
30. Id. at 458-59.
31. Id. at 453.
32. Id. at 455.
33. 272 Ala. 305, 132 So. 2d 120 (1964).
34. Id. at 308-09, 132 So. 2d at 123-24.
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court, in dictum, said that a zoning board of adjustment performs a
"quasi-judicial" function, and thus a court may not be overstepping
its powers of judicial review by hearing a de novo appeal from the
board of adjustment.35
In states that provide for writ of certiorari when reviewing board
of adjustment decisions, courts have usually not permitted the trial
to be de novo. For instance, Missouri courts, in interpreting the state
zoning enabling act providing for writ of certiorari to review the
legality of the board's decision, have emphasized that review by cer-
tiorari is not a trial de novo, even though the statute authorizes the
taking of additional testimony.36
Whether a zoning decision is "quasi-judicial" or "legislative" and
whether a statutory grant of de novo review power is an unconstitu-
tional grant of legislative power to the courts are difficult questions.
The presence of judicial and legislative aspects in zoning agency deci-
sions make classification difficult.37 Courts have sought to avoid these
troublesome questions by condemning or limiting de novo provisions.
The Iowa Supreme Court in Vogelaar seems to have avoided these
problems by limiting the de novo provision in the Iowa statute to
mean that the hearing is de novo only in the sense that additional
testimony may be taken if necessary. The certiorari provision then
limits the court's review to questions of illegality. The court refused
to read the de novo provision to mean that it may fully relitigate the
case. By so following the Anderson precedent, the court avoided the
question of the propriety of substituting its judgment for that of the
Board. Scope of judicial review questions brought about by de novo
provisions, like those in American Beauty Homes and Ball, were also
avoided.
The Vogelaar court recognized the distinction between the spe-
cial exception and the variance, as the terms were used in the Iowa
zoning enabling act and as they have been interpreted by other
courts. It correctly upheld the granting of a special use permit for a
sanitary landfill in an argicultural district since the use was specifi-
35. Id. at 310, 132 So. 2d at 125.
36. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Leimkuehler, 276 S.W.2d 633 (Mo. App. 1955);
Veal v. Leimkuehler, 249 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. App. 1951).
37. For a detailed discussion of this problem, see Note, Judicial Control Over
Zoning Boards of Appeal: Suggestions for Reform, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 937
(1965). See also Note, Administration of Zoning Flexibility Devices: An Ex-
planation for Recent Judicial Frustration, 49 MINN. L. Rlv. 973 (1965).
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cally prescribed by the county ordinance. The court saw its role in
reviewing the Board of Adjustment's granting of the permit as that
provided by the zoning enabling statute and limited by past Iowa
decisions. By so construing the Iowa enabling statute and by effec-
tively distinguishing the special exception from the variance, the
court avoided misuse of the special exception provision and put the
court's role in reviewing the administrative action of the Board of
Adjustment in its proper perspective.
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